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THE PATENTABILITY OF MICROORGANISMS: STATUTORY
SUBJECT MATTER AND OTHER LIVING THINGS
Eric W. Guttag*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past 200 years,' the federal patent laws have been used
to encourage advances in scientific and technological areas. Pur-
suant to its constitutional authority "To Promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts," 2 Congress has provided statutory pro-
tection for new and useful inventions.3 Consistent with constitu-
tional and congressional mandates, patent rights4 have been granted
for inventions which were diverse in both subject matter and com-
plexity. For instance, the scope of patentable subject matter now
extends to such highly sophisticated and revolutionary technologies
as lasers, computers, and photocopiers.5
* Patent attorney with Procter-Gamble Corp., Cincinnati, Ohio; B.A., Carleton College,
1974; J.D., University of Richmond School of Law, 1977.
1. The first patent law was enacted shortly after the United States Constitution became
effective. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The stated constitutional objective of the patent laws is to
encourage such "progress" by providing exclusive rights of limited duration to iriventors in
their creations in exchange for public disclosure of their ideas. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). However, the primary purpose of the patent system lies in
advancement of the arts and sciences and not reward of the individual. Sinclair & Carroll
Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945). An inventor may find it more profita-
ble not to disclose his idea, and thus protect it as a trade secret. For a discussion of the dual
choice of the inventor, see Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. 470, 487-88.
3. The present patent laws are codified in 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). Because Congress
has exercised constitutional authority in this area, the states are preempted from granting
rights equivalent to those created by the federal patent laws. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (unpatentable pole lamp held not protectable under state unfair
competition law); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (unpatenta-
ble reflector design held not protectable under state unfair competition law). In the unlikely
event that Congress abolishes the federal patent laws, a state could still enact its own form
of patent protection. Cf. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret
law not preempted by federal patent laws); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state
tape piracy statute not preempted by federal copyright laws) (state grants of patent protec-
tion in 18th century noted).
4. The holder of the patent is given the right for seventeen years from the date of issuance
to prevent all others from making, using or selling the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
5. Over 100,000 applications for patent protection are filed each year in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. Approximately 50,000 of these applications are issued each
year as patents. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). The patents issued (now
over 4 million) are categorized into hundreds of classes and thousands of subclasses.
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Due to the inherently fast moving characteristics of the field, it
has been difficult for patent legislation to keep pace with technolog-
ical change. There are recent indications that certain meritorious
inventions may not be given a patent for their failure to fit into
certain enumerated statutory classes of patentable subject matter.
For example, the patentability of computer programs (software) was
placed in doubt by the 1972 Supreme Court decision of Gottschalk.
v. Benson. I While the Court dealt with an extremely narrow issue,
Benson, at least subtly, suggests that the patent laws may have
been lost in the wake of technological progress.8
In addition to computer software, another area of very recent
concern is the patentability of living organisms. The products of
recombinant DNA research,9 as well as other types of genetic engi-
neering, have opened a new area of subject matter deserving patent
law protection.'0 With this background, one court has attempted to
resolve the question of microorganism patentability. The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) held in the case of In re
Bergy" that a biologically pure culture of a microorganism was pat-
entable subject matter. In the later and more extraordinary case of
In re Chakrabarty,'2 the CCPA ruled that a novel, man-made, and
6. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
7. In Benson, claims to a method of converting binary-coded decimal numbers to pure
binary numbers were held unpatentable as not defining a "process." Further doubt has been
created by the recent decision of Parker v. Flook, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (1978), where a method for
updating alarm limits in a catalytic conversion process was held unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1952). See note 26 infra for a further discussion of the Benson and Flook
decisions.
The fact that a judicial body in 1948 is forced to use the same language as that found
in the decisions of Baron Alderson, Lord Chief Justice Eyre, or Lord Mansfield with
regard to the patentability of certain scientific claims, is certainly a vivid commentary
upon the continuous and widening gap between the world of technological advance and
the world of law.
8. Inlow, That Non-Patentable Law of Nature, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc:'v 487, 488 (1948)
(commenting on Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)).
9. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the basic gerietic material of all living organisms. By
utilizing certain special enzymes, man has been able to "cut and paste" this genetic material
to form new genetic combinations, hence the term "recombinant." VAN NOSTRAND'S SCIEN-
TIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1894-96 (5th ed. 1976).
10. Another technique which has created some controversy is the cloning of parent organ-
isms to produce offspring with identical genetic structures. Presently, clones of plants and
certain lower forms of mammals have been created. I. Kayton, Living Microorganisms,
ADVANCED U.S. PATENT PRACTICE 2, 12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kaytonl.
11. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
12. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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genetically engineered species of microorganism was patentable.
Bergy and Chakrabarty are primarily concerned with the patenta-
bility of microorganisms, thus leaving two important issues open.
The first narrower question is the extent to which living subject
matter other than microorganisms are patentable. The second
broader question asks what is an outer limit to patentable subject
matter. In an attempt to answer these questions, the first part of
this article will deal generally with patentable subject matter re-
quirements, particularly in relation to microorganisms. The second
part of this article will analyze the CCPA decisions of Bergy and
Chakrabarty in order to ascertain the underlying principles relating
to microorganisms as patentable subject matter. Finally, an at-
tempt will be made to resolve these two questions regarding patent-
able subject matter and recent case law as discussed herein.
II. THE STATUTORY CLASSES OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Section 101 of the patent statutes enumerates four classes of sta-
tutory subject matter. 3 The four categories are processes,'" ma-
chines,' 5 manufactures,'6 and compositions of matter.' 7 To be enti-
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), which also includes "improvements" of the four categories.
The statutory classes have varied only slightly prior to the present statutes. See, e.g., Act of
April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109 (art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device or
improvement thereof); Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11 § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter or improvement thereof). For a concise historical
development of the statutory classes see In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159 (C.C.P.A. 1976)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 54 L. Ed .2d 155 (1977). For the purposes of this article,
the phrases "patentable subject matter" and "statutory subject matter" are interchangeable.
14. "A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is
an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced
to a different state or thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). Under the present
statutes, the term "process" is equivalent to the words "process, art or method" and includes
a "new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1952). Prior to the present statutes, it was questionable whether a "new
use" was patentable. E.g., In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (new use of old
compound unpatentable); Old Town Ribbon & Carbon Co. v. Columbia Riblon & Carbon
Mfg. Co., 159 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 1947) (new .use of old manufacture unpatentable). Even
under the present statutes, a "new use" is pat6ntable only as a "method" or "process." In re
Hack, 245 F.2d 246, 248 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (new use claim to old composition unpatentable
where not in "process" or "method" form). See also Ex parte Miller, 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 261
(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1947) (insecticide DDT claimed as "method for killing insects").
15. "The term machine includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical
powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result." Coming
v. Burden, 55 U.S. (15 How.) 503, 505-06 (1853). See also Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken.
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tled to patent protection, a new and useful invention'8 must fall
within at least one of these statutory classes."9
The courts have also enumerated a number of categories not enti-
tled to patent protection by case law. For instance, an abstract
principle, idea or law of nature has been repeatedly considered un-
patentable." Methods of doing business, 2' mental steps, 2 printed
203 F. 699, 702 (3rd Cir. 1913), ("machine" associated with something having operative
motion or mobility), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913). The words "apparatus" or "device"
are also used and are equivalent to or encompassed by the term "machine." See J LADIS,
MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAiM DRAFrTNG §§ 11-12, at 17-20 (1st ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Landis]. See also In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 160 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (dissenting opinion)
("machine" and "apparatus" interchangeable), cert. denied, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977).
16. "The term 'manufacture,' as used in the patent law, has a very comprehensive sense,
embracing whatever is made by the art or industry of man, not being a machine, a composi-
tion of matter, or a design." Johnson v. Johnston, 60 F. 618, 620 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1894). But
see notes 53-61 infra and accompanying text which indicate that the definition of
"manufacture" may not be so broad. As the above definition implies, the term
"manufacture" is a catch-all category which encompasses a number of diverse, man-made
products. See, e.g., Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Rogers, 130 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1942) (drive-in
theatre); In re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (unassembled kit of interrelated parts).
17. The term "composition of matter" includes "all compositions of two or more substances
and includes all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids." Shell Dev. Co. v.
Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957) (citing WALKER ON PATEN'nI), aff'd per curiam,
252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also LANDIS, supra note 15, § 46, at 119-20. The term usually
refers to a product distinguished by its chemical nature as opposed to its physical shape or
form. Id.
18. The word "invention" is a very ambivalent term in the patent law. It can be used to
describe the entirety of the inventor's creation. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, par. 2 (1970). It has also
been used to define the "patentable novelty" of the inventor's creation, i.e. that part which
is a significant technological advance. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948), which is discussed further at notes 72-80, infra, and accompanying
text.
19. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). A particular invention will
frequently be covered by more than one class. See In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (bacteria either a "manufacture" or "composition of matter"); In re Jones, 373 F.2d
1007, 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (code disc for encoder either a "manufacture" or subcombination
of a "machine").
20. E.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). While certain countries such as the Soviet Union
have granted protection for the bare discovery of a "law of nature" or the like, the United
States patent statutes have been construed to cover only practical applications of such
"laws." See, e.g., Funk Bros., supra at 130; Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). See generally O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-
20 (1853), where Samuel Morse, inventor of the telegraph, unsuccessfull attempted to claim
"electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs,
or letters, at any distances. . ." as patentable.
21. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 US 875 (1977)
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matter,2 and mathematical formulas or algorithms24 have also been
deemed outside the ambit of the patent laws. Although not always
explicit on the issue, the courts imply that this excluded subject
matter does not fall into any of the four statutory categories.25
In the cage of microorganisms, it is conceivable that such subject
(dictum), citing In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934). In Wait, claims to a process for
selling stocks, commodities and the like were apparently held invalid for want-of novelty.
After a careful reading, Wait does not necessarily support the dictum postulated in Chatfield.
See Wait, supra at 983. See also Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467,
472 (2d Cir. 1908), where the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a new and useful
system of cash registering and account-checking would be an "art" (process) within the
meaning of the patent statutes.
22. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972) (method of converting from binary coded decimal numbers to pure binary
numbers not "mental steps"). See In re Bernhardt, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (method
of portraying a three-dimensional object in two dimensions using a computer not "mental
steps"); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (method of determining
desired characteristics of airfoil profile unpatentable "mental steps"). The "mental steps"
doctrine formed the first hurdle to the patentability of computer programs. In re Abrams,
188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (method for detecting petroliferous deposits unpatentable
"mental steps"). See also LANDIS, supra note 17, § 41, at 88-98, for an excellent discussion of
the "mental steps" doctrine with respect to computer programs.
23. Latz v. Reliance Graphic Corp., 98 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 648
(1938) (communication sheet not a "manufacture"); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A.
1934) (bank checks and stubs thereof non-patentable subject matter); In re Russell, 48 F.2d
668 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (novel arrangement of names in directories and dictionaries non-
patentable subject matter). However, "printed matter" is non-statutory only if the primary
purpose is to convey intelligence to the reader. In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007, 1012-13 (C.C.P.A.
1967) (patterns on code disc defined physical structure unrelated to any intelligence convey-
ing function). See also In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969), where the CCPA
held that volumetric indicia marked on a measuring cup should be given weight in determin-
ing patentability.
24. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The Supreme Court considered mathemati-
cal formulas and algorithms analogous to unpatentable abstract ideas. See id. at 71. The
inarticulate and frequently ambiguous language of Benson has caused considerable confusion
in the CCPA. See In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub noma., Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), where Judge Rich poignantly said: "I am probably as much-if
not more-confused by the wording of the Benson opinion as many others." 502 F.2d at 773
(dissenting opinion). The CCPA's valiant effort to differentiate between patentable and non-
patentable subject matter in view of Benson has not always been successful. Compare In re
Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (method of updating alarm limits of a process variable in
a catalytic hydrocarbon conversion process held patentable subject matter), with In re de
Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (method for generating curves held unpatentable
subject matter). The Supreme Court has recently reversed the CCPA in Flook with poten-
tially adverse implications for other areas of patent law besides computer programs. Parker
v. Flook, 46 U.S.L.W. 4791 (U.S. June 22, 1978).
25. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972); Latz v. Reliance Graphic Corp., 98
F.2d 679, 680 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 648 (1938).
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matter could be considered patentable either as a "manufacture,"
or as a "composition of matter." This article now proceeds to a
historical development of these two non-patentable categories by an
examination of relevant case law.
A. Product of Nature
The doctrine that a "product of nature" cannot be patented has
been frequently stated by various courts. While ceitain decisions
have professed to rely on this doctrine, a careful consideration of the
facts involved in the cases suggests that the basis for the holdings
lies elsewhere.2s For example, the two Supreme Court decisions of
American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co. (The Wood
Paper Patent)9 and Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik,0
which have been cited for the "product of nature" doctrine,3' were
actually attempts to patent old compounds. 2 The few cases that are
clearly premised on the doctrine imply that a "product of nature"
is non-statutory subject matter.?
26. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
27. A "product of nature" is defined in this article as a naturally occurring element,
composition of matter or substance that can be found in and extracted from minerals or living
organisms. See Note, Patent Law-Patentability as Affected by the Law of Nature Rules-
The Kalo Doctrine, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 391, 395 (1949) ("product of nature" one occurring on
earth in form not changed by human act).
28. See In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (ductile uranium unpatentable), and
In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (ductile vanadium unpatentable), where it appears
that the pure elements were known or isolated prior to the applications for patent. See also
Patent Law, supra note 27, at 396.
29. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874).
30. 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
31. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 152 F. Supp. 690, 698 (W.D. Va.
1957), rev'd, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
32. In the Wood Paper Patent case, the patent was directed to a purer cellulose pulp
suitable for manufacturing paper. The Supreme Court held the patent invalid in view of the
fact that cellulose pulp suitable for manufacturing paper was used long before the patent in
suit was applied for. 90 U.S. at 593-94. In the Cochrane case, the pabnt was directed to
"artificially produced" alizarine. The Supreme Court correctly held that alizarine is alizarine
whether produced artifically as in the patent in suit or by previously known extraction from
the madder root. 111 U.S. at 311. See also In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938) ("artificial"
ultramarine unpatentable).
33. See General Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642-43 (3rd Cir. 1928), cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1928) (pure tungsten unpatentable); Ex parte Reed, 135 U.S.P.Q. 34
(Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961), petition for reconsideration granted, 135 U.S.P.Q. 105 (Pat. Off.
Bd. App. 1961) (naturally occurring alpha-lipoic acid extracted from liver unpatentable); Ex
parte Berkmann, 90 U.S.P.Q. 398 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1950) (physiologically active material
derived from plants unpatentable); Ex parte Snell, 86 U.S.P.Q. 496 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1950)
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A major difficulty for the courts has not been in stating the doc-
trine, but rather in determining whether there is such a doctrine and
how to apply it. In General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 4
the inventor had patented "substantially pure tungsten having duc-
tility and high tensile strength." Prior to that- time, the element
tungsten had not been produced in pure form, but rather existed in
nature as an oxide. The court held the patent of the substantially
pure tungsten to be invalid as a "product of nature." The court
reasoned that, while the inventor had discovered the natural quali-
ties of pure tungsten, he did not, in fact, create pure tungsten .l 5
In contrast to the General Electric case, other courts seem to take
the position that there is no "product of nature" doctrine. In Parke-
Davis & Co. v. H. K. Wolford Co.,35 the inventor had patented
adrenalin extracted from the glands of animals. Rejecting the con-
tention that the extract was not a new "composition of matter,"
Judge Learned Hand held the claims to the extract valid on two
grounds. First, he noted that others had believed that adrenalin was
a salt, whereas the inventor's extract was in the form of a base, "a
distinction not in degree, but in kind. ' 37 Second, Judge Hand stated
that "even if it were merely an extracted product without change,
there is no rule that such products are not patentable."' ' According
to Judge Hand in Parke-Davis, whether or not adrenalin qualified
as a "product of nature" was irrelevant to its patentability.
(vitamin B-6 produced artificially unpatentable when shown to be naturally occurring sub-
stance). See also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (55th Rev. 1978).
Although not expressed, the argument appears to be that a "product of nature" by defini-
tion is not man-made, and is therefore not within the enumerated statutory classes which
protect only man-made creations. See General Elec., supra. Another basis for the "product
of nature" doctrine may be that the naturally occurring substance is not "new" within the
meaning of the patent statutes. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 152 F.
Supp. 690, 699-700 (W.D. Va. 1957), rev'd, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
34. 28 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1928).
35. Id. at 643. While admittedly the inventor did not create the element tungsten, neither
did nature create "pure" tungsten in that it was producable only by the inventor's process.
Therefore, it is difficult to understand why "pure" tungsten could not be patented as a new
"manufacture." See Patent Law, supra note 27 at 395.
36. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
37. 189 F. at 103. The "distinction in kind rather than degree" phraseology has apparently
been adopted by later courts as the test for separating patentable from unpatentable
"products of nature." See cases cited in notes 46-47, infra.
38. 189 F. at 103. In Judge Hand's view, the extract was "a new thing commercially and
therapeutically." Id.
19791
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Another decision which apparently rejected the "product of na-
ture" doctrine is Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.3 9
In Olin Mathieson, the inventors claimed a patent fo vitamin B-12
active compositions which had been extracted from the fermenta-
tion products of a certain strain of fungi. The District Court held
the claims to be invalid." Although a number of grounds were pre-
sented for the invalidity of the claims,4' the Court of Appeals found
the primary basis for the conclusion of the District Court to be that
the claims were directed to a "product of nature." In reversing the
District Court, the Court of Appeals held that the activated B12
compositions were new and useful "compositions of matter." At the
same time, the Court of Appeals indicated that it was not impressed
by the "product of nature" doctrine: "There is nothing in the lan-
guage of the Act which precludes the issuance of a patent upon a
'product of nature' when it is a 'new and useful composition of
matter' and there is compliance with the specified conditions for
patentability. 4 2
Rather than either totally accepting or rejecting the "product of
nature" doctrine, some courts have attempted to establish a distinc-
tion based on purification of the naturally occurring material."
39. 152 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Va. 1957), rev'g, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
40. In holding the vitamin B-12 active compositions unpatentable "products of nature,"
the District Court found the compositions to "differ merely in degree, and not in kind" from
naturally occurring materials. 152 F. Supp. at 699.
41. The District Court further held the compositions to be invalid, as lacking "invention"
in the "patentable novelty" sense. 152 F. Supp. at 700.
42. 253 F.2d at 161. The Court of Appeals found the "product of nature" doctrine separable
into two distinct doctrines. The first doctrine was that an old product was unpatentable even
though derivable from a new source by a new process. Because the active compositions did
not exist prior to the patent in suit, the first doctrine did not apply. The second doctrine was
that a purified product did not represent a patentable advance if it differed merely in degree
and not in kind. Because only the compositions of the patent in suit contained the therapeuti-
cally and commercially desired activity, the second doctrine was also inapplicable. See id.
at 162-64. For other cases which apparently reject the "product of nature" doctrine, see, Chas.
Pfizer & Co. v. Barry-Martin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 191, 194 (S.D. Fla. 1965)
(tetracycline held patentable although occurring naturally in trace amounts in Aureomycin);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955) (1-arterenol separated
from racemic mixture of arterenol found in glands of human body held patentable).
43. See generally, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232 (1951). An analogous line of cases involves
the purification of non-naturally occurring materials. In re Williams, 171 F.2d 319 (C.C.P.A.
1948) (substantially pure laero rotary form of compound separated from racemic mixture held
patentable); In re Fink, 62 F.2d 103 (C.C.P.A. 1932) (substantially oxygen free composite
metal held unpatentable); Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705
(7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 622 (1911) (purified aspirin held patentable).
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Mere purification of the naturally occurring material has been held
insufficient to make the unpatentable product patentable.4 How-
ever, purification which resulted in a difference of "kind rather than
degree" has been held to be a patentable change. 5 In practice, the
inventor is required to show that the purification of the naturally
occurring product results in the extraction of a previously unknown
substance," or a known substance which has unexpected proper-
ties."
The effort to rationalize the "product of nature" doctrine on the
basis of degree of purification of the naturally occurring substance
raises two interesting points with respect to the question of what
constitutes patentable subject matter. First, some of the decisions
cannot be easily distinguished simply on the basis of the degree of
purity of the naturally occurring substance. Why extracted adren-
alin is patentable while substantially pure tungsten is not is a ques-
tion which the courts have failed to answer. 8 Secondly, the purified
"product of nature" cases seem to indicate a general dissatisfaction
with "product of nature" doctrine. It is clear that the courts did not
regard the purification of the naturally occurring substance as
merely a purified "product of nature", but rather as a new
"composition of matter."49 Indeed, the question usually raised "was
44. In re King, 107 F.2d 618 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (purified vitamin C held unpatentable); In re
Macallum, 102 F.2d 614 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (purified composition of solid phosphate of calcium
and hormone of duodenal mucosa held unpatentable); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938)
(artificially produced ultramarine having "non-floatable impurities" held unpatentable); In
re Ridgway, 76 F.2d 602 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (purified alpha alumina held unpatentable).
45. In re Doyle, 327 F.2d 513 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (6-amino penicillanic acid extracted from
penicillin producing moulds held patentable); Ex parte Parke, 64 U.S.P.Q. 335 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1944) (purified crystalline sodium d-panto-thenati held patentable); Cf., In re Williams,
171 F.2d 319 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (substantially pure laero rotary form of compound held patenta-
ble).
46. Cf., In re Williams, 171 F.2d 319 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (no showing that compound was
known to be racemic).
47. In re Doyle, 327 F.2d 513 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (purified 6-amino penicillic acid shown to
produce greater quantities of pure antibiotic); cf. Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfield
Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910) (purified aspirin therapeutically different from unpurified
aspirin); Ex parte Parke, 64 U.S.P.Q. 335 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1944) (purified crystalline
sodium d-pantothenate different in form and physical properties).
48. See note 37 supra.
49. See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (purified PGE2 and
PGE3 "new" within meaning of Section 101); Merck & Co. v. Chase Chem Co., 273 F. Supp.
68, 83 (D. N.J. 1967) (later case in different circuit holding vitamin B-12 active compositions
.new" compositions of matter). See also, Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78, 82 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1976) (dissenting opinion):
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whether this new "composition of matter" represented a patentable
advance over the naturally occurring substance.20
In the midst of the purified "product of nature" cases is another
line of cases which suggests that there may be an intermediate,
unpatentable category between "products of nature" and the statu-
tory classifications of patentable subject matter. The principle case
in this area is American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.5' In
American Fruit, the inventor claimed that citrus fruit in which the
rind had been impregnated with borax was a "manufacture." By so
impregnating the rind, the fruit became resistant to blue mold
decay. The Court of Appeals held that the complete article of the
fruit and borax was patentable as it was "not found in nature" and
was "thus an article of manufacture. '52
The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the borax-
impregnated fruit was not a "manufacture" within the meaning of
the patent statutes. First, the Supreme Court defined patentable
"manufactures" as, "'. . . articles [produced] for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, quali-
ties, properties or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by mach-
inery.' Also 'anything made for use from raw or prepared materi-
The expression "product of nature" does not appear in Section 101 and, as such, a
material should not be excluded on that basis alone, as being non-tatutory. Rather, I
view a "product of nature" as being something that "exists" in nature and therefore
evidence that it may not be "new" as this expression finds meaning in the Patent
Statute. Accordingly, I would treat "products of nature" like any other material and
determine whether they are new or obvious in view of the state of the art.
50. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (whether pure compounds
have the same usefulness or properties as impure compounds is a question of obviousness).
Mere novelty of the invention is not enough for patent protection. It has long been a judge-
made requirement that there be some sort of "patentable advance." See, e.g., Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850) (more ingenuity and skill than an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with business). See also Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) ("flash of creative genius" rather than mere skill of the calling).
Because of the diverse definitions of "patentable advance" by various courts, Congress at-
tempted to uniformize the standard, now codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103, as "obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the said subject
matter pertains." See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (codification of
precedents involving Hotchkiss standard). However, the attempt at uniformity has not been
entirely successful. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1976), which suggests
that a different standard be applied to "combination patents" (whatever that means).
51. 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
52. 35 F.2d at 108. The Court of Appeals also upheld the validity of the claims to the
process for impregnating the fruit.
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als.' ",.3 The Supreme Court then applied its definition to the im-
pregnated fruit:
Addition of.borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from
the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinc-
tive form, quality or property. The added substance only protects the
natural article against deterioration by inhibiting development of
extraneous spores upon the rind. There is no change in the name,
appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh or-
ange fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.54
In conclusion, the Supreme Court cited the tariff importation cases
of Hartranft v. Wiegmann 5 and Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v.
United States" for further support of its narrow definition of
"manufacture" under the patent statutes. 57
In view of the definition of "manufacture" selected by the Su-
preme Court in American Fruit, it seems difficult to understand
why an impregnated fruit rind is not a "manufacture" within the
meaning of the patent statutes. One commentator has attempted to
rationalize the American Fruit decision on the basis that the effect
of the borax coating was to create a property which was independent
of the inherent qualities of the fruit .5 However, the dictionary defi-
nition of "manufacture" utilized by the Supreme Court in American
Fruit encompasses a "new combination" of existing materials. It
would seem, then, that a fruit, the rind of which was impregnated
with borax, would be a "new combination" of both the fruit and the
borax. Yet, the Supreme Court in American Fruit appears to ignore
arbitrarily the last part of its dictionary definition of
"manufacture." 9
53. 283 U.S. at 11.
54. Id. at 11-12.
55. 121 U.S. 609 (1887).
56. 207 U.S. 556 (1908).
57. In Hartranft, the Supreme Court held that ground shells and shells etched by acid were
not "manufactures of shells" within the meaning of the Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 68, § 22,
12 Stat. 192. In Anheuser-Busch, the Supreme Court held that specially treated corks were
not "manufactures" within the meaning of the Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.
As to how the purposes of the tariff laws and the patent laws coincide so that definitions of
the former can be used for .the latter is unclear. Cf. Microbiological Plant Patents, 10 IDEA
87, 91 (1966).
58. Kayton, supra note 10, at 8 (necessary to render American Fruit consistent).
59. Because the Supreme Court had better grounds for its holding, the distorted definition
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Application of the "new form, quality or property" test of
American Fruit by the courts and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office has not been an easy matter."' Most of the deci-
sions indicate that articles which are the result of mechanical treat-
ment will be excluded by the test,6 ' while articles which are the
product of chemical combination, treatment or reaction will not.2
However, other cases seem to indicate a general lack of understand-
ing of the American Fruit test.63 A liberal application of the
American Fruit test might also make it difficult to justify those
cases holding purified "products of nature" as patentable subject
matter. 4 However, these cases appear to have totally ignored
American Fruit, as well as its definition of "manufacture. '6 15
B. Living Subject Matter
There is nothing in the patent statutes expressly prohibiting the
patenting of living organisms. Processes employing living subject
matter in the form of bacteria 6 or other organisms 7 have been re-
of "manufacture" is particularly regrettable. The Supreme Court also invalidated the proces
claims for impregnating the fruit, but on the ground that it was not novel because boric acid
had been previously applied to various articles of food, including fruit. Thus, it seems logical
that a borax impregnated fruit could similarly have been held invalid. See 47 Mich. L. Rev.
391, 396 n.28 (1949).
60. Some tribunals have apparently been leery of basing their holding of invalidity solely
on the rationale of American Fruit. See In re McKee, 75 F.2d 636 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (application
disclosing "frozen sliced meat" also held to lack "invention" over cited references); Ex parte
Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1941) (deveined shrimp also held to lack
"invention" over ordinary shrimp of commerce).
61. See In re Ewald, 129 F.2d 340 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (cored half pear); In re McKee, 75 F.2d
636 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (frozen sliced meat); Ex parte Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1941) (deveined shrimp). See also In re McKee, 75 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (edible
animal carcass having pigment branding thereon), and Ex parte Mork, 21 U.S.P.Q. 50 (Pat.
Off. Bd. App. 1933) (artificially colored coal), for cases analogous to mechanical treatment.
62. See Steinfur Patents Corp. v. William Beyer, Inc., 62 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1932) (dark
colored fur bleached and dyed light color); Ex parte Mowry, 110 U.S.P.Q. 389 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1955) (erosion/stable soil comprising natural soil and a water-soluble polymer); Ex parte
Shepherd, 185 U.S.P.Q. 480, 483 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1974) (soil treated with fumigant and
polymer gel).
63. See Ex parte Hempel, 55 U.S.P.Q. 429 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942) (fish livers permeated
with preservative patentable; American Fruit distinguished as relating to coated object).
64. See Kayton, supra note 10, at 10-11.
65. At least one purified "product of nature" case has made passing reference to American
Fruit. Ex parte Berkman, 90 U.S.P.Q. 398, 401 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1950). See also Kayton,
supra note 10, at 11.
66. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453, 462-63 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 209 U.S. 548 (1908) (the original septic tank); Ex parte Prescott, 19 U.S.P.Q.
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peatedly upheld as patentable subject matter. However, Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp.6" suggests that there might be a
distinction between processes utilizing living organisms and living
organisms alone. In upholding the Weizmann process for the pro-
duction of acetone and butyl alcohol by bacteriological fermenta-
tion, the court in Guaranty Trust made the following observation:
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann
patent is unpatentable since it is for the life process of a living organ-
ism. Were the patent for bacteria per se, a different situation would
be presented. As before stated, the patent is not for bacteria per se.
It is for a fermentation process employing bacteria discovered by
Weizmann under conditions set forth in the specification and claims.
Undoubtedly there is patentable subject matter in the invention."
While the above italicized sentence casts doubt on the patentability
of living organisms alone, this issue was not before the Court.
Besides Guaranty Trust and the related cases involving processes
employing living organisms, the only other case which possibly deals
with the patentability of living organisms is Funk Brothers Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co.70 In Funk Brothers, the inventor had obtained
a patent for a legumihous plant inoculant formed of a composite of
non-inhibitive strains of bacteria. Prior to the inventor's composite
inoculant, the mixing of selected strains of bacteria had presented
a problem in that the bacteria in the mixture tended to be mutually
inhibitive. The inventor discovered that certain strains of bacteria
were non-inhibitive so that they could be mixed together into a
useful composite inoculant. The Court of Appeals, reversing the
178, 180 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1932) (bacteriological production of butyl and isopropyl alcohol).
See also City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 576 (1934) (bacteriological purification of sewage); In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (process for producing antibiotic using previously unknown microorganism).
67. See Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratories, 43 F.2d 628, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (process
for producing scarlet fever antitoxin by injecting animal with sterile toxin and obtaining
antitoxin therefrom). In Lederle, the Court also upheld process claims to the manner of
making the sterile toxin utilizing a microorganism, as well as product claims to the toxin and
antitoxin so produced.
68. 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), aff'd per curiam, 61 F.2d 1041 (3rd Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 614 (1933).
69. 54 F.2d at 410 (emphasis added).
70. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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District Court, held that the composite inoculant defined a patenta-
ble invention. 71
Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court, 7
reversed the Court of Appeals. 73 First, Justice Douglas noted that
that the inventor could not patent the non-inhibition qualities of the
bacteria because they were the "work of nature." Second, Justice
Douglas stated that once it became known that certain strains of
bacteria had a non-inhibitive quality, "the state of the art made the
production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. ' '7, Next, Justice
Douglas reasoned that there was no invention in the inventor's com-
posite inoculant "unless the discovery that certain strains of the
several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive and may thus be
safely mixed is invention. ' 75 However, Justice Douglas concluded
that to do so would allow a "patent to issue on one of the ancient
secrets of nature now disclosed." Under this logic, 76 Justice Douglas
held the claims to the mixed inoculant invalid as not disclosing an
invention or discovery within the meaning of the patent statutes. 77
71. 161 F.2d at 986:
It was this contribution of non-inhibitive strains which successfully combine that
brought about a new patentable composition. This was application of scientific knowl-
edge to things existing in nature and the utilization of them in a desirable composite
product which had hot been previously achieved but which he did achieve and of which
the public now has the benefit.
72. Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the reasoning of thd majority opinion, and concurred
solely on the ground that the description in the patent was vague and indefinite. 333 U.S. at
132-35. Justices Burton and Jackson dissented from the majority opinion in its entirety. Id.
135-38.
73. The majority opinion is so obscure and inarticulate that it has been cited for a number
of different propositions. See, e.g., Microbiological Plant Patents, supra note 59, at 94 (com-
posite inoculant unpatentable "aggregation"); Products of Nature: The New Criteria, 20
CATH. U. L. REv. 783, 787 (1971) (composite inoculant unpatentable "product of nature").
74. 333 U.S. at 132.
75. Id.
76. The logic of Justice Douglas in Funk Bros. is erroneous. As the Court of Appeals and
the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter correctly observed, the inventor was not patent-
ing a "law of nature", but instead a practical application thereof, namely a new composite
inoculant of bacteria that did not exist in nature. By holding the pabmt to the composite
inoculant invalid, Justice Douglas also violated the long standing principle that realization
of the problem troubling the relevant industry is frequently more important to patentability
than the solution thereof which usually follows in due course. See Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. 261 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1923).
77. It is questionable whether Funk Bros. is good law in view of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970),
which was enacted subsequent to the decision. In Funk Bros., Justice Douglas, in essence.
used the discovery by the inventor as "prior art" against his composite inoculant. Such a
practice is proscribed by the first sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 103, which requires that the subject
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What was most extraordinary about the Funk Brothers decision
was that the issue of the mixed inoculant as "living" subject matter
was never raised. The Supreme Court based its decision regarding
the validity of the patent on a different ground, namely, whether the
mixed inoculant defined a patentable advance within the meaning
of the statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court seemed to assume that
the mixed inoculant was statutory subject matter. Thus, the case
law, other than the dicta in Guaranty Trust, suggests that living
organisms are patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the
patent laws.7"
Perhaps, the issue that raises the greatest doubt as to the patenta-
bility of living subject matter under section 101 are the plant patent
sections enacted in 1930. 71 Under these sections, one who discovers
or who invents and reproduces through asexual processes a new and
distinct variety of plant is entitled to patent protection.' Except for
matter of the invention be viewed "as a whole" at the time of the inventor's creation thereof.
In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 664-65 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (hydrocarbon cracking process using novel
zeolite held patentable, although the process of using other zeolites in hydrocarbon cracking.
deemed old); In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (process of producing
antibiotic using unknown microorganism held patentable, although other microorganisms
known to produce same antibiotic). But cf. Parker v. Flook, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (1978), where the
Supreme Court has incorrectly stated that a newly discovered algorithm is to be treated as
"prior art." Furthermore, Justice Douglas in Funk Bros. seems to imply that if the inventor
had accidentally created the composite inoculant, the patent might have been upheld. Such
a proposition is contrary to the second sentence of 35 U.S.C. 103, which prevents the patenta-
bility of the invention from being affeeted by the manner in which it was made.
78. See Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78, 81 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1976) (dissenting opinion):
The Court [in Funk Bros.] seems to have acted on the assumption that the subject
matter of the controversy was, like any other subject matter, not to be singled out for
any special determination, but to be evaluated for patentability in the ordinary man-
ner. At the very least, the majority holding can be said to be neutral on the subject of
whether strains of bacteria fall within the statutory classes of patentable subject mat-
ter.
79. Now codified as 35 U.S.C. § 161-64 (1970).
80. Id. § 161. See generally Hayman, Botanical Plant Patent Law, 11 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
430 (1962), for a general discussion of the plant patent sections. For the most part, plant
patents are governed by the sections relating to utility patents. See, e.g., Yoder Bros. v.
California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1094 (1977) ("obviousness" provision of 35 U.S.C. § 103 applicable); In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d
929, 935 (C.C.P.A. 1962) ("printed publication" provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) applicable);
See also Nicholson v. Bailey, 182 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Fla. 1960) ("knowledge or use of others"
provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), "public use" provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and "notice of
patent" provision of 35 U.S.C. § 287 applicable); Cole Nursery Co. v. Youdath Perenial
Gardens, Inc. 17 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1936), appeal dismised, 101 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir.
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certain specified classes of plants,"' there is nothing in the plant
patent sections to expressly exclude other forms of living subject
matter from the protection of the patent laws. However, there are
subtle indications that, until the plant patent sections were en-
acted, no form of living organism was within the boundaries of the
patent laws. For instance, the legislative reports on the plant patent
sections of both the Senate and House state the following:
The purpose of the bill is to afford agriculture, so far as practicable,
the same opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent
system as has been given industry, and thus assist in placing agricul-
ture on a basis of economic equality with industry. The bill will
remove the existing discrimination between plant developers and
industrial inventors.8 2
This stated objective of the plant patent sections has been noted
several times by the courts 3 and at least one court has assumed in
dictum that plants did not come within the patent laws until the
plant patent sections were enacted.84 Thus, the plant patent sec-
tions could indicate that Congress did not intend to permit patent
protection for other forms of living subject matter, unless by express
legislative enactment.85
However, there are other indications that Congress was not ex-
pressing an opinion on the patentability of all things that could be
1939) ("public use" provision of old 35 U.S.C. § 31 [now 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)j applicable).
However, there are a number of exceptions, such as the satisfaction of certain formal
requirements and the manner of infringing a plant patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1970) (plant
patent application need not fully comply with the formal requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 if
the description is as complete as is reasonably possible); Cole Nursery Co. v. Youdath Per-
ennial Gardens, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1936), appeal dismissed, 101 F.2d 1007 (6th
Cir. 1939) (patented plant must be either totally appropriated or cuttings taken therefrom
for infringement).
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1971) (tuber propagated plants and plants found in an unculti-
vated state).
82. S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1930).
83. E.g., In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F.
Supp. 665, 670 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1960).
84. Yoder Bros. v. California-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1377 5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
85. The best argument for the proposition that plants were not patentable prior to 1930
can be found in a little known and little discussed transitory provision See Act of May 23.
1930, ch. 312, § 5, 46 Stat. 376, which precluded patent protection for plants introduced prior
to May 23, 1930.
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considered "living" by enacting the plant patent sections. In In re
Arzberger,86 the CCPA had an opportunity to rule on the question
of whether bacteria are "plants" within the meaning of the plant
patent sections. In holding that bacteria are not "plants" within the
plant patent sections, the CCPA noted that, while bacteria might
be scientifically classified as "plants," the common meaning of the
word did not encompass bacteria. The CCPA then examined the
legislative history of the plant patent sections and noted that Con-
gress was thinking of the word "plants" in its popular and ordinary
sense and not in its scientific sense. Thus, Arzberger could support
the argument that while Congress may have expressed a view as to
the patentability of certain types of living subject matter in the
popular sense, e.g. plants, it expressed no view as to the patentabil-
ity of other forms of living subject matter in the broader scientific
sense, e.g. microorganisms. 7
Another plausible position is that, in enacting the plant patent
sections, Congress expressed no view as to the patentability of living
subject matter under the currently existing provisions of the patent
laws. First, Congress may have enacted the plant patent sections in
order to alleviate certain formal requirements of the existing patent
laws which Congress. believed impaired plant patent protection.-"
Secondly, Congress may have wished to expressly sanction plant
patent protection in order to clarify any potential misunderstan-
dings under prior existing law." Whatever Congress meant in enact-
ing the plant patent sections, the legislative intent is sufficiently
ambiguous to support either the patentability or non-patentability
of other forms of living subject matter other than plants.
86. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940). See generally Microbiological Plant Patents, supra note
59, which criticizes the holding in Arzberger.
87. See Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78, 82 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1976) (dissenting opinion):
Of the various acknowledged nonstatutory categories, plants are most akin to the living
organisms. Both materials are alive. However, that is where the similarity stops. As
held in the Arzberger case, living organisms (bacteria) are not plants within the mean-
ing of the plant statute. While bacteria may possess some of the characteristics of
plants, the word "plant" is used in its popular sense and not in its scientific sense since
the statute was designed for the benefit of agriculturists and horticulturists. Thus, the
exclusion of plants from 35 U.S.C. [§ 101] does not necessarily apply to bacteria.
88. See In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42-43 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (argument by appellant).
89. Because the courts, as in Funk Bros., supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text, appear
to implicitly assume that living subject matter other than plants was patentable, such an
argument, though weak, is not entirely without merit.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
HI. THE PATENTABILITY OF MICROOGANISMS: THE CCPA SPEAKS OUT
Prior to the decisions of In re Bergy"I and In re Chakrabarty," the
CCPA had given no indication that it was favorably inclined to the
idea of granting patents for any form of living subject matter other
than plants. In In re Mancy, 12 the applicants claimed a process for
producing the antibiotic daunorubicin by aerobically cultivating a
certain microorganism known as streptomyces bifurcus. This strain
of microorganism was "new" in that it was not disclosed by any of
the references cited by the examiner. The Patent Office Bbard of
Appeals affirmed the rejection of the examiner that the applicants'
invention was obvious under Section 103 in view of the cited refer-
ences. The CCPA reversed the Patent Office Board of Appeals by
holding the applicants' invention nonobvious over the cited refer-
ences. In so deciding, the CCPA concluded its opinion with the
following comment:
Here [applicants] not only have no allowed claim to the novel strain
of Streptomyces used in their process but would, we presume (with-
out deciding), be unable to obtain such a claim because the strain,
while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of record, is,
as we understand it, a "product of nature. 9 13
While the above statement is clearly dicta, the CCPA in Mancy
seemed to give an indication that it would not uphold the patenta-
bility of other forms of living subject matter besides plants. 4
In In re Merat, 11 the applicant attempted to patent both a process
for producing normal chickens from dwarf hens and normal cocks,
and the chicken so produced by the process. The examiner rejected
the claims under Section 101 as being directed to non-statutory
subject matter. The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed this
ground of rejection and added two new grounds; namely, that the
claims were obvious under Section 103 over cited references and
90. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
91. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
92. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
93. Id. at 1294.
94. See also Behr, The Prescient Microbe or Where to Deposit a Foreign Body, 57 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'v 28, 29-30 (1975) (no reasonable possibility in any jurisdiction for protection of
microorganisms per se).
95. 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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were indefinite under Section 112. The CCPA affirmed on the Sec-
tion 112 grounds and, therefore, found it unnecessary to discuss the
non-statutory subject matter rejection under Section 101. Thus, the
issue of the patentability of living organisms other than plants re-
mained open.
A. In re Bergy
In view of the, at best, neutral comments in Mancy and Merat,
the CCPA proceeded with its momentous decision in In re Bergy. 11
In Bergy, the applicants disclosed a microbiological process for pre-
paring the antibiotic lincomycin by utilizing a newly discovered
microorganism, streptomyces vellosus. As originally filed, the appli-
cation had claims only to the process of preparing the antibiotic by
the newly discovered microorganism. However, the applicant later
filed an additional claim to a "biologically pure culture of the mi-
croorganism streptomyces vellosus" having certain identifying char-
acteristics. The claim to the biologically pure culture was rejected
solely on the ground that it was non-statutory subject matter under
Section 101 as being a "product of nature."97 Applicant was unsuc-
cessful in convincing the examiner that the biologically pure culture
was not a "product of nature", and therefore appealed to the Patent
Office Board of Appeals.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's
rejection of the claim directed to the biologically pure culture of the
microorganism." However, it based its rejection not on the ground
that the pure culture was a "product of nature", but solely on the
theory that a "living organism" was non-statutory subject matter
within the meaning of Section 101. First, the Patent Office Board
of Appeals reasoned that Section 101 should be "strictly construed
and, when so interpreted, precludes the patenting of a living organ-
ism." Next, the Patent Office Board of Appeals pointed to the
plant patent sections as evidencing the legislative view that living
organisms, whether plants or microorganisms, were not
"manufactures" or "compositions of matter" within the meaning of
96. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
97. Because the impure culture of microorganism existed in nature, it is easy to see why
the "product of nature" doctrine was brought into play.
98. Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1976).
99. Id. at 79.
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Section 101.10° By holding applicant's biologically pure culture non-
statutory subject matter on the ground that it was, directed to a
"living organism," the Patent Office Board of Appeals found it un-
necessary to reach the "product of nature" issue.""
When the case reached the CCPA, Judge Rich, speaking for a
plurality of the court, ' found it necessary to clarify the issue pre-
sented since the Patent Office Board of Appeals had switched its
rejection from the "product of nature" ground of the examiner to the
newly raised "living organism" ground. From a review of the pro-
ceedings in the Patent Office, Judge Rich concluded that the
"product of nature" issue had been abandoned and was no longer
in the case. However, because of the somewhat muddled nature of
the earlier proceedings, Judge Rich still found it necessary to make
the following observation:
However, since the solicitor indicated at oral argument that he was
not sure the Board had removed it entirely, we state that we find it
wholely lacking in merit. The biologically pure culture of claim 5
clearly does not exist in, and is not found in, and is not a product of
"nature." It is man-made and can be produced only under carefully
controlled laboratory conditions.0 3
Having disposed of the "product of nature" issue, Judge Rich
found it necessary to clarify the prior CCPA decisions of Merat and
100. Id. In the Patent Office Board Of Appeals' view, a "liberal interpretation" of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 would raise the spector of the patentability of new type of insecti or new varieties of
animals produced by selective breeding and cross-breeding. For arguments as to why this
would not be necessarily so, see notes 143-45, infra, and accompanying text.
101. 197 U.S.P.Q. at 80. One Board member dissented. Portions of his opinion have been
reproduced elsewhere. See notes 80, 89, supra.
102. Judge Markey joined Judge Rich's opinion. Judge Kashiwa, sitting by designation in
place of Judge Lane, concurred separately as to the "narrow confines" of Judge Rich's opin-
ion. 563 F.2d at 1039. Judges Miller and Baldwin dissented.
103. Id. at 1035. While Judge Rich appeared to conclude that the "product of nature"
question was no longer in issue, the preceding statement necessitates a few remarks. Although
the biologically pure culture might have been man-made and produceable only under certain
specified laboratory conditions, this fact alone did not resolve the issue of whether the pure
culture was a patentable advance over the naturally existing unpurified culture. As even prior
CCPA decisions pointed out, mere purification of what existed in nature might not be patent-
able unless there was a difference in "kind and not degree," e.g. the pure culture resulted in
some unexpected property. See notes 45-49, supra, and cases cited therein. However, from
what was presented in the record of the case, there is very little to indicate, one way or the
other, how this question should have been resolved.
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Mancy. With respect to Merat, Judge Rich noted that the question
of patentable subject matter under Section 101 had been left open.
In regard to Mancy, Judge Rich explained that the CCPA was con-
cerned there with a hypothetical organism that was "pre-existing
and merely plucked from the earth, . . . a far cry from a biologically
pure culture produced by great labor in a laboratory and so
claimed.""' To whatever extent the dictum in Mancy might support
the proposition that microorganisms were unpatentable subject
matter, Judge Rich specifically retreated from such a position.
Having disposed of preliminary matters, Judge Rich then moved
to the main issue of whether the "fact that the biologically pure
culture, as claimed, is alive removes it from the categories of inven-
tions enumerated in Section 101." 10-1 In concluding that it did not,
Judge Rich presented two different arguments. The first argument
was by analogy to the Guaranty Trust line of cases which had held
processes utilizing living organisms to be patentable subject matter.
Because processes utilizing living organisms had been held patenta-
ble subject matter, Judge Rich reasoned that a claim directed to a
microorganism as a "manufacture" or "composition of matter"
must likewise be patentable, unless there be some distinction be-
tween the statutory classes. However, as Judge Rich correctly
pointed out: "The statute makes no distinction between manufac-
tures and compositions qn the one hand and processes on the
other."' 06
While Judge Rich's argument by analogy has logical merit, the
CCPA's prior decisions unfortunately lend little support to it. As
noted by the dissenters in Bergy, what logic dictates and what case
law requires are two entirely different matters.'07 As prior CCPA
decisions clearly indicate in other areas, subject matter which is
104. 563 F.2d at 1036.
105. Id. at 1035.
106. Id. at 1037. In finding no express distinction between the statutory classes, Judge Rich
also rejected any suggestion by the Patent Office Board of Appeals that 35 U.S.C. § 101 must
be "strictly construed" to prohibit the patentability of microorganisms.
107. 563 F.2d at 1041 (dissenting opinion): "However, this court has pointed out that
claims directed to processes of using an algorithm to operate a system constitute patentable
subject matter while claims directed to the algorithm per se (or to methods of calculating
using the algorithm) do not. [Citations omitted]. Similarly here, the fact that claims di-
rected to a process of using microorganisms constitute patentable subject matter does not
logically compel the conclusion that claims to biologically pure cultures of microorganisms
are patentable."
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statutory when claimed in a certain context may yet be non-
statutory when claimed alone.e 8 Thus, Judge Rich's "argument by
analogy" is premised on a very uncertain case law foundation.01
The second argument of Judge Rich in support of patentability
seems to be based on the proposition that there is a distinction
between the meaning of the word "living" as broadly used and as
used under the patent statutes. As stated by Judge Rich:
The nature and commercial uses of biologically pure cultures of mi-
croorganisms like the one defined in claim 5 are much more akin to
inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and
catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or raspberries and
roses.
10
Because microorganisms were "a useful and technological art,"
Judge Rich felt that they should not be denied patent protection on
the formalistic ground that they were "alive." Therefore, Judge
Rich held the distinction between microorganisms and chemical
compounds based on the animateness of the former to be "without
legal significance."
There is at least implicit support for Judge Rich's second argu-
ment in the case law. As noted previously, the CCPA in Arzberger
stated that there was a distinction between the scientific and com-
mon place meaning of certain words such as "plants." Taking that
analogy one step further, it could be argued that microorganisms,
while "living" in the broad scientific sense, are not "living" in the
narrow common place or patent law sense of the word."' In charac-
terizing the fears of the Patent Office Board of Appeals as "far
fetched," Judge Rich appears to adopt this reasoning when he ob-
served that the question of the patentability of "plants, animals and
108. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nom., Parker v. Flook,
98 S.Ct. 2522 (1978) (process utilizing non-statutory "algorithm" to modify convention manu-
facturing system held statutory subject matter); In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A.
1969) (non-statutory "printed matter" entitled to patentable weight when used with statutory
"manufacture"). The Supreme Court, despite protestations to the contrary, has cast severe
doubt on the preceding proposition. See 46 U.S.L.W. at 4793.
109. See Kayton, supra note 10, at 4 (argument by analogy relatively weak in view of
controlling case law).
110. 563 F.2d at 1038.
111. See note 89 supra, and accompanying text.
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insects created by man" was not before the court."12
Surprisingly, Judge Rich's opinion quickly discounted the Patent
Office Board of Appeals argument as to the influence of the plant
patent sections:
Nor are we influenced by the legislative history of the Plant Patent
Act of 1930 in the course of which nobody had anything to say about
patent protection for microorganisms, so far as we know. The collec-
tive mind of Congress was not turned in that direction. We are not
here concerned with the interpretation of the Plant Patent Act as this
Court was in In re Arzberger, supra, which simply held that that Act
did not encompass bacteria."'
It was these plant patent sections which formed the primary focus
for Judge Miller's dissenting opinion that the biologically pure cul-
ture of the microorganism was non-patentable."4 First, Judge Miller
found the legislative history of the plant patent sections to be ex-
tremely persuasive that plants were not covered by the predecessor
of Section 101 until the plant patent sections were enacted. Sec-
ondly, he found Judge Rich's attempts "to distinguish between mi-
croorganisms and more complex living things" to be "purely gratui-
tous" and unpersuasive. As Judge Miller perceived the situation,
the plant patent sections, as well as the legislative history pertain-
ing thereto, supported the conclusion that no living organism was
intended by Congress to be within the scope of Section 101.'"' Fi-
nally, Judge Miller referred to the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970116 as further evidence that Congress did not intend living organ-
isms to be within the terms "manufacture" and "composition of
matter" as defined in Section 101.
Although Judge Miller's argument is certainly reasonable, it is
not irrefutable. As noted previously, there is a logical basis, perhaps
not clearly set forth in Judge Rich's opinion, for distinguishing be-
112. 563 F.2d at 1038.
113. Id. at 1038-39, citing In re Arzberg, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
114. Id. at 1039-41.
115. Judge Miller's position was based essentially on two arguments. First, to hold that
living organisms were patentable prior to the enactment of the plant patent sections would
render those sections superfluous. Second, if plants were originally patentable subject matter,
the plant patent sections would constitute a repeal by implication of certain formal require-
ments still applicable to other patentable subject matter. Id. at 1039.
116. Now codified as 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq.
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tween microorganisms and more complex living organisms. Also,
reliance on the plant patent sections as evidence of legislative intent
on the patentability of all forms of living subject matter is an ex-
tremely slippery proposition. The legislative history of the plant
patent sections is, at best, ambiguous on the point. Furthermore,
what case law there is, both prior to and after enactment of the
plant patent sections, gives no indication that microorganisms were
considered outside the scope of the patent laws."17 As rioted by Judge
Rich, the patentability of microorganisms was probably never con-
sidered when Congress enacted the plant patent sections."5
B. In re Chakrabarty
When the CCPA rendered its decision in In re Chakrabarty, "' it
progressed significantly, though perhaps unconsciously, beyond its
holding in Bergy.2 ° In Chakrabarty, the applicant's invention was
directed to a novel, man-made microorganism. Specifically, the
applicant had "genetically engineered" a new strain of bacteria hav-
ing an increased capacity to degrade various components of crude
oil by transmitting to a single microorganism a plurality of compati-
ble extrachromosomal units known as "plasmids.' 2' The modified
organism created by the applicant was particularly important in
that it could be used to control oil spills.
The examiner rejected the claims directed to the modified mi-
croorganism under Section 101 as being drawn either to "products
of nature", 22 or to "living organisms." The Patent O)ffice Board of
Appeals reversed as to the first ground, but affirmed as to the sec-
ond ground presented by the examiner. The reasons presented by
the Patent Office Board of Appeals were essentially those rejected
in Bergy. 123
117. See notes 68-80, supra, and accompanying text.
118. See 563 F.2d at 1039.
119. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
120. See Kayton, supra note 10, at 4 (different technology in Chakrabarty makes case
genuinely different with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 101 from Bergy).
121. By transmitting the plasmids to a single microorganism, applicant overcame the prior
art problem of mutual inhibition or destruction which accompanied a mixture of the various
strains of microorganisms.
122. The "product of nature" rejection is particularly odd in that the modified microorgan-
ism did not exist in nature.
123. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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The CCPA reversed the Patent Office Board of Appeals decision
with a terse opinion by Judge Rich speaking for a plurality of the
Court. As Judge Rich saw it, the sole reason advanced for the Patent
Office Board of Appeals' contention was that the new bacterium was
"alive." He therefore reasoned that the present case and Bergy were
indistinguishable on the issue before the Court. Having ruled in
Bergy that a biologically pure culture of microorganism was patent-
able subject matter, Judge Rich found that decision to be control-
ling precedent for the patentability of a novel, man-made microor-
ganism.' 4
The rather revolutionary step that the CCPA was taking in
Chakrabarty was highlighted in the dialogue between the concur-
ring opinion by Chief Judge Markey and the dissenting opinion by
Judge Baldwin. Chief Judge Markey stated the issue as "whether a
man-made invention, admittedly novel, useful, and unobvious, is
unpatentable because, and only because, it is 'alive.' "' According
to Chief Judge Markey, there were but two sources for
"manufactures" and "compositions of matter," namely God (na-
ture) and man. Because the invention before the Court was a
"manufacture" by man, it was therefore "squarely within the lan-
guage of the statute."'' 6 In rebuttal to the position of the Patent and
Trademark Office that the word "dead" should be inserted into the
statute, Chief Judge Markey observed, "The statute is not ambigu-
ous. No Congressional intent to limit patents to dead inventions
lurks in the lacuna of the statute, and there is no grave or compel-
ling circumstance requiring us to find it there."' 27 Chief Judge Mar-
key found the plant patent sections of no weight in determining
what the Congressional intent would have been had it been con-
fronted with a modified microorganism. Furthermore, he felt it was
unnecessary to assume that plants were within the scope of the
patent statutes prior to the 1930 enactment of the plant patent
sections. Because the modified bacteria fell squarely within the
terms "manufacture" or "composition of matter" as enacted by
Congress, Chief Judge Markey felt that to interpret Section 101
otherwise would "defeat the fundamental purpose of the Constitu-
tion, and of the patent laws enacted thereunder."'28
124. Id. at 43.
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In response to Chief Judge Markey's argument, Judge Baldwin
raised for the first time the test set forth in American Fruit. In
"addition to Chief Judge Markey's categories of "products of nature"
and "manufactures," American Fruit, according to Judge Baldwin,
added an intermediate category of something not a "product of
nature," yet not sufficiently modified so as to be a statutory
"manufacture." After quoting the relevant portions of American
Fruit, Judge Baldwin summarized the case by stating that "a modi-
fied natural product does not become statutory subject matter until
its essential nature has been substantially altered."'29
In resolving the issue of whether the applicant's modified bacteria
had been changed in its "essential nature," Judge Baldwin made
the curious assumption that the "essential nature" of the unmodi-
fied microorganism was "its animateness or life." However, the ap-
plicant had not changed "this essential nature" in that he had not
created "new life." While the applicant's genetic grafting may have
removed the new microorganism from the classification of "a mere
product of nature," Judge Baldwin felt that such a modification did
not render the new microorganism patentable subject matter under
Section 101.111
After analyzing Judge Baldwin's opinion, one has to wonder why
the "essential nature" of the unmodified microorganism was its
"animateness," as opposed to some other feature or quality.13'
Under American Fruit, it would seem that the applicant's geneti-
cally modified microorganism clearly satisfies the test set forth. A
microorganism which has been modified so as to digest oils, which
the unmodified microorganism was unable to do, would seem to be
the type of "new distinctive form, quality, or property" to which
American Fruit alluded.3 2 To say then that the "essential nature"
128. Id.
129. Id. at 45.
130. Id. Judge Miller repeated essentially his dissenting opinion in Bergy. See id. at 45-
47.
131. See Kayton, supra note 10, at 10:
For example, suppose Chakrabarty taught in his specification that, in addition to
being a greedy oil-eater, the new (or altered) bacterium has other radically different
characteristics which happen to be of no interest to us (e.g., it may be opaque rather
than transparent, it may be larger, it may be hour-glass shaped instead of oval, or it
may be one millimicron wider).
132. See id. at 9: "Using the criterion of American Fruit, *** the Chakrabarty bacterium
fits precisely into the Court's definition of novel statutory subject matter."
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of the microorganism was its "animateness" seems to inject a
subjective determination into the test of American Fruit without
any clear reason for doing so.ss
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATENTABILITY OF MICROORGANISMS
A. Are Other Living Organisms Patentable Subject Matter?
Admittedly, the decisions rendered by the CCPA in Bergy and
Chakrabarty are binding only in that court. Other courts confronted
with the infringement. of patents directed to microorganisms may
reach the same conclusions asserted by the dissenting opinions in
those cases. Assuming that Bergy and Chakrabarty remain valid,lu
what effect will those decisions have on the patentability of other
living organisms? The majority of the CCPA does not necessarily
evidence a uniformity of thought. Judge Rich's opinion in Bergy
suggests that he would draw the line between microorganisms, or
entities similar thereto, on the one hand, and complex living organ-
isms on the other. In contrast, Chief Judge Markey's opinion in
Chakrabarty supports the position that as long as the organism is
"man-made," the complexity of the organism created is irrevelant.
Finally, Judges Miller and Baldwin clearly reject the patentability
of any living organism whether it be denominated complex or not.
Professor Kayton has attempted to predict the patentability of
other living organisms produced by cloning techniques and recombi-
nant DNA research by utilizing the American Fruit test.'1 Under
American Fruit, Kayton believes that a cloned organism is unpa-
tentable subject matter.13 Such a position would probably be sup-
133. See id. at 11-12:
Life or lack of life is simply not involved in the analysis under American Fruit unless
you adopt Judge Baldwin's totally gratuitous approach which says it is the form, or
quality, or property called "life" which has to be changed (presumably into death?)
in order to have an article of manufacture. To take that approach is to convert a
conclusion into the premise of an argument and then to jump from that premise
immediately to the conclusion.
134. The United States Patent and Trademark Office has petitioned for certiorari in the
Bergy case. 376 PAT. T.M. & CoPR. J. D-1 (1978). The Supreme Court has recently summarily
vacated the judgemnt in the Bergy case and remanded for further conisderation in light of
its decision in Parker v. Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522 (1978). Parker v. Bergy, 98 S. Ct. 3119 (1978).
However, in view of the dissimilarities of the subject matter involved in Parker v. Flook and
Bergy, it is unlikely that the CCPA will change its mind on the patentability of microorgan-
isms.
135. Kayton, supra note 10, at 12-13.
136. Id. at 12.
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portable by even Chief Judge Markey because, by definition, the
cloned organism has not been changed at all.'3 7 Indeed, as noted by
Kayton, all the judges of the CCPA would undoubtedly hold a
cloned organism unpatentable as being neither new nor novel within
the meaning of Sections 101 and 102.'18
In contrast, Professor Kayton believes that the products of recom-
binant DNA research are clearly patentable subject matter in that
the organisms so created are the result of significant modifica-
tions.' 39 However, it is unclear whether a majority of the CCPA
would hold all products of recombinant DNA research patentable
subject matter. Because the organism which is the product of re-
combinant DNA research is "man-made," Chief Judge Markey
would probably hold it to be patentable subject matter. However,
if Judge Rich's opinion in Bergy can be accepted at face value, it
would seem that Judge Rich would hold a complex organism, which
is the product of recombinant DNA research, to be non-patentable
subject matter.4 ' Assuming that Judges Baldwin and Miller main-
tain their stated positions in Bergy and Chakrabarty, the patenta-
bility of the products of recombinant DNA research would seem to
depend on the type of organism created.
A case would go far towards resolving the doubt by answering the
thorny question of the patentability of animals produced by breed-
137. Id.: "Is the living clone itself statutory subject matter? Under American Fruit it
probably is not, because it is not anything that has been changed radically. In fact, it is
identical by definition (because of its identical genetic structure) to the parent from which it
was cloned:"
138. Id. at 12-13:
However, even if the clone were statutory subject matter, it would be unpatentable
for lack of novelty under § 102 of the statute. By definition, the clone will be structur-
ally identical to its parent or to what its parent was at the same age. Nothing about
it, therefore, can be considered to be new.
139. Id. at 12:
If the product of the plasmid transfer in the Chakrabarty sense is statutory, then
anything created through recombinant DNA engineering is statutory, a fortiori. Even
if the product of a plasmid reconstruction or transfer is non-statutory, it would appear
that a product of recombinant DNA construction could be so radically different a
creature that even under Judge Baldwin's standards it would be statutory unless his
criterion categorically eliminates any form of living organism from the statutory
classes.
140. The distinction between complex organisms on the one hand and microorganisms or
entities similar thereto on the other seems to be absolutely necessary for the logical support
of Judge Rich's opinion in Bergy. See notes 112-14, supra, and accompanying text.
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ing and cross-breeding, an issue left open by the CCPA in Merat. "I
A combination of the apparent position of Judge Rich with the
clearly stated positions of Judges Miller and Baldwin, would appar-
ently result in a holding that an animal that is the product of breed-
ing and cross-breeding constitutes unpatentable subject matter.'
The only judge who might advocate patentability would be Chief
Judge Markey. However, even Chief Judge Markey might deter-
mine such an animal to be unpatentable subject matter if the word
primarily were inserted before the phrase "man-made."'' 3 There-
fore, the fear expressed by the Patent and Trademark Office in the
Bergy case of the potential patentability of more complex living
organisms appears to be groundless.
B. What Are the Outer Limits of Patentable Subject Matter?
Like. the issue of the patentability of other living organisms be-
sides microorganisms, the decisions of Bergy and Chakrabarty
imply a division of thinking on the outer limits of patentable subject
matter in general. On the one hand, there is the group, primarily
represented by the Patent and Trademark Office and the two dis-
senting judges in Bergy and Chakrabarty, which argues that the
outer limits of patentable subject matter should be strictly con-
strued. These strict constructionists advocate that when Congress
enacted the statutory classes of subject matter, it intended only to
protect those inventions which were closely akin to conventional
technology. Accordingly, to construe the statutory classes of patent-
able subject matter liberally would be to invade a domain expressly
left to Congress. If certain meritorious inventions, such as novel
microorganisms, happen to fall outside the statutory classes, the
strict constructionists believe that it is the duty of Congress to ex-
pressly bring these new technologies within the ambit of the patent
statutes.'
141. See note 97, supra, and accompanying text.
142. I.e., a combination of complex living organisms are unpatentable (Judge Rich) and
all living organisms besides plants are unpatentable (Judges Baldwin and Miller).
143. Normally, an animal produced by breeding and cross-breeding is substantially the
result of non-human forces. However, if substantial human ingenuity or intervention was
required to produce the new animal, Chief Judge Markey might well consider such a new
animal patentable subject matter. The interpretation of "obvious" under 35 U.S.C. § 103 may
also pose a significant barrier to the patentability of such animals.
144. Regrettably, it seems that the Supreme Court has also taken this "head in the sand"
approach to patentable subject matter. See Parker v. Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2529 (1978): "It
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In contrast, the liberal constructionists, who are primarily repre-
sented by the majority of the court in Bergy and Chakrabarty, be-
lieve that the outer limits should be generously construed to encom-
pass a broad class of new and useful inventions. The liberal con-
structionists argue that when Congress enacted certain statutory
classes of subject matter, it did not intend to have these enumerated
classes rigidly interpreted so as to exclude radical advances in the
technological arts. The statutory classes of subject matter were to
serve merely as broad guidelines since Congress clearly realized that
newer forms of technology might well outstrip conventional notions
of patentable subject matter. To hold otherwise, the liberal con-
structionists say, would require Congress to engage in the hopeless
task of continually modifying its definition of patentable subject
matter to conform to the advances in technology.
Unless Congress expressly states otherwise, the liberal construc-
tionist view seems to be the preferable one. First, the very nature
of technological advance militates against an inflexible interpreta-
tion of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter.)"
Second, the continual conflict over what is and is not patentable
subject matter has tended to obscure the more important question
of whether the given invention constitutes a meritorious advance-
ment of the public's knowledge. Indeed, the "product of nature" line
of cases suggest that the courts may be confusing the question of
what constitutes patentable subject matter with the question of
whether the subject matter represents a patentable advance in the
art.' 4
6
Third, the standards enunciated by the courts determining what
constitutes patentable and non-patentable subject matter appear to
is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of cur prior precedents,
and we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress."
145. See Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RurrGERS J. COMP. & L.
1, 21 n.135 (1977): "Inventions by their very nature contain unforeseen elements. There is
therefore good reason for some degree of flexibility in patent statute administration, for one
would not wish to see the invention of tomorrow placed in yesterday's unsuitable category."
146. See generally Products of Nature, supra note 75 (criteria employed to determine
patentability of "products of nature" are imprecise and confusing). A majority of the Su-
preme Court seems to have also totally confused the issue of patentable subject matter undgr
35 U.S.C. § 101 with the question of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. See Parker v. Flook,
98 S. Ct. 2522, 2526-28 (1978). Such confusion has not gone unnoticed by the remainder of
the Supreme Court. Id. at 2530-31 (dissenting opinion).
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place too much weight on a subjective determination. 47 Moreover,
the test of whether a certain item constitutes patentable subject
matter within the meaning of Section 101 appears to have been
employed in the past for reasons inconsistent with the statutory
purpose. For instance, the Patent and Trademark Office has appar-
ently utilized the Section 101 defense to alleviate what it perceives
as burdensome administrative Problems. 4' However, as Chief Judge
Markey observed in Chakrabarty, "Administrative difficulties, in
finding and training Patent and Trademark Office examiners in new
technologies, should not frustrate the constitutional and statutory
intent of encouraging invention disclosures, whether those disclo-
sures be in familiar arts or in areas on the forefront of science and
technology."'4
Finally, as noted in the above quotation, if certain technologies
are denied patent protection for failure to be within the enumerated
statutory classes of patentable subject matter, the patent laws' pri-
mary purpose of encouraging disclosure to the public of meritorious
inventions 50 may be thwarted. If particular inventions are deter-
mined to fall outside these specified classes, those inventors will
seek other forms of protection, such as trade secrets. For technolo-
gies which are easily the subject of "reverse engineering,' 5' the
problem will not be so great. However, for those technologies as
sophisticated as the genetically engineered microorganism of
Chakrabarty, the public is going to be denied important and useful
information if such inventions are protected as trade secrets in re-
sponse to the denial of patent protection. 5
147. Products of Nature, supra note 75, at 788.
148. See 371 PAT. T.M. & COPR. J. D-l, D-7 & n.24 (1978) (brief of Government in Parker
v. Flook 98 S.Ct. 2522 (1978)). The intense effort by the Patent and Trademark Office to
employ 35 U.S.C. § 101 to nullify potentially meritorious subject matter has evoked on one
occasion allegations by the CCPA of unprofessional conduct. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237, 1243 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
149. 571 F.2d 40, 44 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
150. See note 2 supra.
151. "Reverse engineering," e.g., analyzing the publicly available product to divine the
secret process, has always been a proper method for discovering a trade secret. Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
152. In the case of "genetically engineering," the man-made microorganism may provide
little information on the process used to produce it, therefore "reverse engineering" could
,require years of research. See Microbiological Plant Patents, supra note 59, at 90, which
describes the problems created by the Aureomycin patents due to the inability to patent the
microorganisms prior to Bergy and Chakrabarty. See generally Rol~bins, Patents for Micro-
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A broad outer limit of patentable subject matter does not neces-
sarily mean that there are no articulable boundaries at all. Even the
liberal constructionist recognizes that when Congress enacted the
statutory classes of patentable subject matter, Congress intended to
protect only practical applications of theory rather than the mere
discovery of a law of nature or natural principle. By holding technol-
ogically useful microorganisms to be patentable subject matter, the
CCPA in Bergy and Chakrabarty did not exceed this legislative
mandate. Indeed, the reasoning in those two cases suggests that
there may yet be limits within even the broadest outer boundaries.
V. CONCLUSION
The CCPA decisions of Bergy and Chakrabarty illustrate the
present controversy over what constitutes patentable subject mat-
ter. Although those two decisions were primarily concerned with the
patentability of microorganisms, the implications are clear for both
the question of the patentability of other living organisms, as well
as the outer limits of patentable subject matter in general. It is also
clear from those decisions that the controversy is not going to go
away on its own. Ultimately, Congress will have to articulate clearer
guidelines as to what constitutes patentable subject matter, be it
living or non-living.
biological Transformations-An International Problem, 42 J. PATr. OF7. Soc'y 830, 833-38
(1960), which notes the difficulty of producing known fermentation products utilizing a new
species of microorganism often vaguely described in the' patent specification.
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